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domestic industries. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Sitovien globaalien ilmastosopimusten puuttuessa Euroopan unioni joidenkin muiden alueiden 
ohella on ottanut käyttöön omia yksipuolisia ilmastopoliittisia keinojaan, kuten EU:n 
päästökauppajärjestelmän. Nämä toimet ovat kuitenkin herättäneet huolen niin sanotusta 
hiilivuodosta, eli päästöjen karkaamisesta ulkomaille, mikäli niitä rajoitetaan yksipuolisilla 
politiikkatoimenpiteillä. Hiilivuotoa voi tapahtua, jos fossiilisten polttoaineiden hinnan lasku 
kannustaa käyttämään niitä enemmän muualla maailmassa, tai jos kotimainen 
energiaintensiivinen teollisuus menettää markkinaosuuksiaan hiilisääntelyn seurauksena. 
 
Tämä tutkielma käy läpi, miten suureksi hiilivuoto on aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissa arvioitu, ja 
mitä toimenpiteitä sen ehkäisemiseksi on ehdotettu. Tuloksia arvioidaan käyttämällä lähtökohtana 
Michael Hoelin (1996) mallia optimaalisten hiilitullien ja hiiliverodifferentiaation määrittelyyn. 
Työ tarjoaa yleiskatsauksen arvioista hiilivuotoasteen suuruusluokalle, sekä arviointia hiilitulleista 
ja nykyisistä politiikkatoimenpiteistä hiilivuodon ehkäisemiseksi. 
 
Tulosten perusteella hiilivuoto on merkittävä uhka vain tietyillä energiaintensiivisillä aloilla, 
jotka ovat alttiita ulkomaiselle kilpailulle. Hiilitullit ja muut rajaverot olisivat siten varsin 
rajallinen työkalu ilmastopolitiikassa. Niiden kustannustehokkuus globaalilla tasolla 
ilmastopoliittisena toimenpiteenä olisi heikohko, sillä niiden vaikutus olisi ennemminkin 
ilmastopolitiikan kustannustaakan siirtyminen teollisuusmaista kehitysmaihin kuin päästöjen 
väheneminen globaalilla tasolla. Sama kritiikki kuitenkin koskee  merkittävässä määrin myös 
nykyisten kaltaisia politiikkatoimenpiteitä EU:ssa. Nykyjärjestelmä, jossa päästöoikeuksia jaetaan 
ilmaiseksi on todennäköisesti myös liian löyhä, ja toimii siten ilmastopolitiikan tavoitteiden 
vastaisesti, tuottamatta kuitenkaan merkittävää hyötyä EU:n oman tuotannon suojelemiseksi. 
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11 Introduction
Reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is one of the largest challenges today
in international politics. Since global warming is considered to be mostly driven by
carbon-dioxide (CO2) emitted by burning of fossil fuels, the most important way to
cut emissions is abatement of fossil fuel consumption. However, countries have this
far disagreed about the relative levels of abatement between countries, and, despite
the recent Paris Agreement, no binding agreements have been made on global level.
Though many areas have adopted unilateral emission reduction schemes, these efforts
have been dampened by fears of a phenomenon known as carbon leakage.
Carbon leakage refers to a situation where policy efforts to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions in a specific region increase emissions in other regions. The definition
looks neat, but the phenomenon is actually immensely complex: carbon leakage
basically covers all changes in emissions in all sectors and regions not directly affected
by the regulation in question. Because only the aggregate amount of emissions on a
global level matters in the case of CO2 emissions, a reduction of emissions in one
part of the world is of no use if it will be offset by an increase somewhere else. Since
no binding global agreements on reducing emissions has been done, countries that
adopt emissions limiting policies need to ensure in their policy design that a large
part of their reductions will not simply be offset by increases elsewhere. Therefore
carbon leakage has been and will be an important issue for unilateral climate policy.
Even though leakage is clearly deemed as an important issue, it is not clear
how it should be tackled in policy-making. The existence of the phenomenon might
serve as an excuse to do nothing, or it may cause political pressures to hand undeserved
benefits to certain interest groups. The European Union has tried to prevent carbon
leakage within its EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) by allocating larger
shares of free emission allocations to those sectors deemed most vulnerable to leakage.
2Additionally, Finland has attempted to ensure competitiveness of its own energy-
intensive industries by rebating energy taxes. According to study by VATT Institute
for Economic Research, these rebates of energy taxes have not been an effective
tool to enhance competitiveness of the firms in those sectors Harju et al., 2016,
even though rebates have risen to over €200 million annually. The result suggests
that inefficient tools for leakage prevention may be both economically wasteful and
counterproductive to the goals of climate policy. This highlights the importance
of a careful policy design to counter carbon leakage, both from environmental and
economic point of view.
In absence of global price for GHG emissions, "carbon tariffs" have been
proposed as the second-best option to ensure effectiveness of climate policies, and
protect the competitiveness of emission-intensive industries in regulating regions.
However, tariffs too are a problematic policy tool to adopt, since they may con-
tradict the rules of international trade agreements, and might be seen as disguised
protectionism.
In this thesis I will review the literature concerning the carbon leakage and
strategies to mitigate it. The next chapter will provide an overview of the most
relevant terms and concepts related to carbon leakage, and introduce the mechanisms
that cause the leakage to occur. In the third chapter I will introduce Michael Hoel’s
(1996) model that analytically shows a solution to optimal carbon tax and tariff levels.
Using this model as a starting point, I will review the estimates for the magnitude of
carbon leakage found in studies in chapter four, and discuss different strategies to
mitigate leakage in chapter five.
32 Key concepts and definitions
In this section I will introduce and define some key concepts related to carbon leakage
and climate change economics.
2.1 Carbon dioxide emissions as a global "public bad"
Nordhaus (1991) characterized greenhouse gases that give rise to global warming "the
granddaddy of all public goods", as the effects of GHG emissions spread all over the
world and indefinitely to the future, while causing serious and unpredictable damages.
The use of fossil fuels, and other GHG emitting goods and resources, are not at an
efficient level because of these climate externalities they produce. Consumers of fossil
fuels do not need to accommodate the harms to climate to their own costs, therefore
a government intervention is required to limit the emissions. In this thesis, when
writing about emissions, I will use carbon dioxide and GHG interchangeably, even
though there are other significant GHGs as well, like nitrous oxides and methane.
However, the same principles can be applied these other GHGs when their global
warming potential is converted to "CO2 equivalence".
In an economist’s perfect world the emissions would be efficiently curbed
by a Pigouvian1 global carbon tax or other kind of pricing mechanism for emissions,
preferably set to tax GHG emissions directly at their source. The tax would set
price on carbon and thus reduce emissions to socially desirable level while allowing
efficient allocation of resources. However, there is no global government to place
the tax, nor a binding international agreement to enforce nation states to do so.
This leaves the policy measures to individual countries or groups of countries. But
since the externality is global in its nature and demand-based measures may increase
1A tax equivalent to the social cost of a negative externality, originally proposed by Arthur C.
Pigou in the book The Economics of Welfare in 1920 (Pigou, 2013).
4other countries’ incentives to use fossil fuels, unilateral measures are not necessarily
effective.
2.2 Carbon leakage: the definition
Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) defines carbon leakage as "the
increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action
divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries" (Barker et al., 2007).
The term itself was probably first coined by Felder and Rutherford, 1993, though
the concept of unintended consequences of environmental policies has been discussed
before. The basic principle of leakage is widely shared in the literature but there
are some nuance differences in how broad sense the term is used between different
studies. For example, B. Copeland and M. Taylor (2005) define carbon leakage
as the pure substitution effect of price change in a fossil fuel price after unilateral
emission reductions. This definition implies that leakage only refers to those changes
in emissions that occur through price changes in fossil fuels. In a broader sense,
carbon leakage includes all changes in foreign emissions caused by domestic efforts
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, or even changes in emissions in sectors other
than the regulated ones.
There are also notions of ’negative leakage’, i.e. situation where emissions
abroad actually decrease rather than increase as a result of abatement policy. Inclusion
of negative leakage and leakage to other domestic sectors in the term means that
it actually refers to all changes in emissions in any period by any actor other than
those to whom the policy is targeted. This is of course what we want to know
when we evaluate a policy: its actual side-effects. However, for analytical purposes
the definition often needs to be narrowed down. For example, If there are other
remarkable mechanisms for emission changes, they are excluded. The point of this
5is to demonstrate that it is important to distinguish between the term’s use in
describing the phenomenon as a whole and the use of the term in a specific study.
2.3 Free riding
The concept of carbon leakage is related to but partly separate from the problem of
free-riding in the climate policy. A country is a free-rider if it stays out of a climate
agreement but gets to enjoy most of the benefits of the policy without paying any of
the costs associated with the GHG emissions. Carbon leakage amplifies this problem.
When goods can be traded across borders, a free riding country does not only get to
enjoy the benefits of reduced emissions, but also gains additional economic benefits
as its industries may gain competitive advantages over those of regulated countries.
2.4 The main mechanisms of carbon leakage
Two main mechanisms for carbon leakage can be distinguished. First is the short
run effect that follows from decreased fossil fuel prices: as demand for fossil fuels
decreases in the region that has adopted tighter regulations, price of the fuels drops
outside the region and their use intensifies. Second is the production relocation
effect: when new controls for emissions are adopted, investment in carbon-intensive
production becomes relatively more profitable in countries with laxer regulations,
which may result in more investments in those countries (M. Babiker, 2005). The
research has mainly focused on the first of these effects, as the immediate short-run
effects are easier to model than more complicated longer-run investment location
choices.
Another way to distinguish the two different main mechanisms for carbon
leakage a general equilibrium setting is to divide the effects to energy and non-energy
6market channels (Burniaux and Joaquim Oliveira Martins, 2012). In non-energy
markets channel carbon abatement leads to higher production costs in energy-intensive
industries. If these industries lose their market share as a result of these higher costs,
production intensifies in countries without abatement policies, which again leads to
higher emissions these countries. The intensity of this mechanism depends on trade
substitution elasticities (i.e. Armington elasticities): larger elasticities mean price
changes have greater effects on market shares. In addition to direct effects in goods
market, non-energy markets leakage may also happen through shifts in foreign direct
investment to non-abatement countries. (Burniaux and Joaquim Oliveira Martins,
2012)
The energy markets channel operates through fall in international prices
of fossil fuels caused by decreased demand in abating countries. This fall would
intensify energy demand and emissions in non-abatement countries. The structure of
the international energy markets is a significant factor for the size and scope of this
effect. There are differences in the structure of international oil and coal markets.
Whereas oil is usually considered fairly homogenous good, integration of global coal
market is much more debatable. (Burniaux and Joaquim Oliveira Martins, 2012)
B. Copeland and M. Taylor (2005) divide unilateral emission cuts’ effects to a
country outside the reduction scheme to free-riding, carbon-leakage and bootstrapping
effects. In their analysis the best solution for climate policy depends on relative
strengths of these effects. The free-rider effect is the pure strategic effect of the
foreign emission restrictions with the price of fossil fuel staying constant. Carbon
leakage is the substitution effect of the following price change in the fossil fuel. The
third effect that the authors call bootstrapping is the income effect: when a country’s
income rises as a result of former two effects, its consumption of environmental
quality rises and thus emissions drop. All three of these effects can be considered to
be mechanisms that contribute to the overall level of carbon leakage, although in
7the authors’ model carbon leakage is only considered as one of them.
2.4.1 Negative leakage and other mechanisms
In addition to the main effects described above, literature has identified several other
mechanisms that may contribute to the carbon leakage, in both positive and negative
ways. The effects that decrease emissions also abroad are called, as mentioned before,
"negative leakage" effects. For example, setting emission restrictions in one country
may accelerate technological change that will make cleaner and cheaper technologies
available in unregulated countries as well. Though negative leakage is not carbon
leakage in the term’s original meaning, it is important to take them into account
when evaluating the effects of unilateral policies. If negative leakage effects are
ignored, estimates of leakage rate will be overestimated.
J Oliveira Martins (1996) suggested that there may exist mechanisms that
cause negative leakage rates in some cases. In Oliveira Martin’s analysis these effects
were caused by the larger relative fall in price of oil in comparison with coal. This
would result to shift in energy use from coal to oil. Since oil’s CO2-emissions per
energy output are significantly coal’s, this could reduce emissions to some extent.
This result shows that negative leakage may occur even through the main leakage
mechanisms.
B. Copeland and M. Taylor (2005) showed that endogenous policy in unreg-
ulated countries may decrease emissions. There is an observed link between increased
income and environmental protection within countries as discussed earlier. Therefore
countries may adopt stricter pollution-control policies if their income rises as a result
of carbon leakage. Endogenous policy change may also arise from other factors than
rising income, for example, adoption of unilateral abatement regulation may increase
political pressure in other countries to adopt their own emissions reduction policies.
8However, this kind of evolution of political processes is pretty hard to capture via
economic modelling.
Endogenous technological change may also have a negative leakage effect.
A carbon tax may accelerate development of emission decreasing technologies. This
is probably part of the intended consequences of the policy scheme in the first place,
but these technological changes do not necessarily only decrease emissions in the
regulated sector but can create spillovers that decrease emissions in other sectors
and countries as well (for example Di Maria and Smulders, 2004; Gerlagh and Kuik,
2007). Di Maria and Van der Werf (2008) described in their theoretical model an
"induced-technology effect". Changes in relative prices caused by carbon regulation
also shift the incentives to innovate to a direction that decreases carbon leakage.
A theoretical paper by Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2011) presents an
Abatement Resource Effect (ARE). This effect occurs when price on carbon induces
firms to abate carbon per unit output by using more clean inputs. This draws
resources from other sectors, which in turn reduces their output, and thus emissions.
In other words, carbon leakage may be reduced, if abatement draws factors away from
other carbon-intensive production activities. Three conditions need to be fulfilled in
order for ARE to occur. Goods cannot be perfect substitutes, taxed sector needs
to be able to substitute some of its carbon-intensive inputs to other inputs, and
labor or capital needs to be mobile between sectors (Elliott and Fullerton, 2014).
Since capital and labor are usually assumed immobile between regions in computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models by which carbon leakage is most often assessed,
they cannot capture ARE. Another negative leakage effect identified by Elliott
and Fullerton (2014) is the “input-output effect” (IOE). If a good is used as an
intermediate output of another good, that other good may become more expensive
as well after carbon tax is applied to the intermediate good. This could reduce
production of the final good and emissions associated with it too.
9Though some authors have incorporated these effects into their models, it is
extremely challenging to try to model things like speed and direction of technological
change or political decision-making in models that try to quantitatively estimate the
magnitude of carbon leakage. Some authors argue that the scope of carbon leakage
tends to be overestimated in the studies because negative leakage effects are not
included in analyses. On the other hand, it is also possible that the extent has been
underestimated, since models do not fully capture possible changes in investment
flows either.
2.5 Leakage rate
Carbon leakage rate is the ratio between total increase in CO2 emissions in countries
that did not adopt abatement measures, and total abatement in countries that
did. For example, if a country adopts a carbon abatement policy that decreases
its emissions by 100 million tons and, as a result, emissions in rest of the world
increase by 40 million tons, the leakage rate is 40% (Paltsev, 2001). Though it
seems that many models estimate the carbon leakage rate to be around 5 to 30
percent (for example Paltsev, 2001; Böhringer and Löschel, 2002; M. H. Babiker and
Rutherford, 2005; Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih, 2008), the estimates depend heavily
on key determinants and some models with certain assumptions have led to results
where carbon leakage would be over 100% (e.g. M. Babiker, 2005). I will provide a
closer look at the estimates of the leakage rate in chapter 4.
Though simple as concept, the carbon leakage rate is also immensely difficult
to predict. The effects result from complex interactions between global energy and
non-energy markets. Direct empirical evidence is impossible to obtain for regulation
not yet adopted, and extremely hard to identify for already adopted regulation
schemes. Therefore measurement of the magnitude of carbon leakage has mainly
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relied on computable models. Models are typically computable general equilibrium
models with multiple regions and multiple sectors where prices determine to a large
extent global supply and demand. Trade flows respond to relative prices changed
by unilateral carbon regulation and as a result carbon emissions change in the rest
of the world. Partly empirical data from input-output tables is combined with
assumptions on market structure and elasticities to compute how world economy
adjusts to adopted regulation (Böhringer, J. Carbone, and Rutherford, 2016).
2.6 Pollution Haven hypothesis
The pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) claims that differences in environmental
protection regulation provide a competitive advantage in pollutant industries to those
countries with laxer regulation (Cole, 2004). This would lead to relocation of those
industries from rich countries with stricter regulations to developing countries with
less or no regulation. The implication of this is that countries set their environmental
protection levels lower than would be socially optimal to promote investment or
exports. It is thus a concept closely related to carbon leakage. In fact, the industry
relocation mechanism of carbon leakage can be understood as a special case of the
pollution haven hypothesis.
The PHH is often linked with environmental Kuznets-curve (EKC). EKC
states that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between per-capita income
and environmental degradation. PHH challenges the view that existence of EKC
would mean decrease in total pollution after a country’s per-capita income reaches a
certain level, but rather implies that the pollution is outsourced from rich countries
to poor ones. (Cole, 2004)
Although carbon leakage can be understood as a special case of wider
PHH, effects of CO2-emissions are quite different from most other pollutants. Other
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pollutants are local or regional bads: contaminated ground water only affects people
who use that particular source of water and acid rains caused by air pollutants affect
only limited – though large – area. However, from a location of production point
of view, CO2-emissions are bad only on global level. Effects of global warming may
differ across regions but the location of where emissions are produced does not make
any difference, only total amount of emissions globally matters.
There is empirical evidence on the existence of the Environmental Kuznets-
curve, but its connection with Pollution Haven Hypothesis seems vague. Several
studies (M. S. Taylor, Antweiler, and B. R. Copeland, 2001, Grossman and Krueger,
1995 and Grossman and Krueger, 1996) suggest that there is a link between income
gains and environmental protection (though the link does not seem to be inverse U-
shaped for all pollutants). For example M. S. Taylor, Antweiler, and B. R. Copeland
(2001) and Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson (2002) find little evidence for PHH. Cole
(2004) states that evidence on the PHH has been mixed. Part of the results imply
that free trade may be harmful to the environment, but the result comes mainly from
the scale effect: increased economic activity in itself increases pollution. Evidence of
pollution shifting from developed to developing countries is quite weak.
Though no clear evidence of PHH on other pollutants has been found,
carbon-dioxide might be a different case. Pollution control costs for other pollutants
may be so small that they do not have significant impacts on location of industries.
Reduction of carbon-dioxide emissions is probably costlier: some improvements can
be made by enhancing energy efficiency but radical reductions require change in
primary energy sources.
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2.7 The Green Paradox
The Green Paradox refers to a situation where a policy that is designed to reduce
emissions leads to an increase of emissions instead. The current debate around
the phenomenon was first started by Sinn (2008). He focused the incentives of
fossil fuel owners to sell their stocks before they lose their value as a consequence
of climate change policies, though the term has more recently come to refer to
emissions-increasing consequences of climate policies in a broader sense. In some
papers a leakage rate of over 100% is defined as the Green paradox (e.g. Eichner
and Pethig, 2011).
The optimal extraction rate of scarce natural resources, such as fossil fuels,
is theoretically the same for both owners of the resources and the society as whole if
there is no extraction costs. This was originally shown by Hotelling (1931). CO2
emissions violate this Hotelling rule because they produce a major externality for
fossil fuel extraction. Therefore socially optimal extraction rate requires government
intervention. However, demand-reducing policies for fossil fuel consumption have two
countervailing effects on current extraction rate: they reduce incentives to extract
today by lowering prices, but they also increase the incentive because anticipated
demand in the future decreases. If the former of these effects is larger, the policy
actually increases current emissions. If the producers now expect that the fossil fuel
will be replaced by clean fuel in the future, they will pump all the fuel if the marginal
cost of extraction is zero. If the interest rate remains unchanged, the price will be
lower at all times before the point of time when producers expect replacement to
happen Sinn, 2008. In the context of carbon leakage this mechanism could also be
understood as intertemporal carbon leakage (Jensen et al., 2015).
If the Green Paradox is a real concern, the expectations of future carbon
regulations become truly important. The price of carbon should be set at a high level
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first, and then lowered if necessary. Otherwise the expectations of tighter regulations
in the future could incentivize suppliers to sell their fossil fuels stocks as more quickly
than otherwise (Eichner and Pethig, 2011). This kind of development is not usually
considered in the estimates of carbon leakage, but it may be relevant when climate
policy measures are designed.
2.8 Pollution and international trade
The debate over carbon leakage is part of the wider discussions on the relationship
between environment and international trade. Both climate policy and trade lib-
eralization are goals of international policy that should generally enhance global
welfare, but in practical level are difficult to agree about. They are also sometimes
seen as somewhat conflicting policy goals; international free trade can be argued to
“cause” the carbon leakage. Under total autarky production could not move from one
country to another as a result of abatement policies because the goods or resources
could not move between different countries. However, in practice the linkage between
freer trade and pollution is much more complex. For example, Kuik and Gerlagh
(2003) studied effects of increasing trade liberalization to carbon leakage rates. Due
to implementation of Uruguay round’s agreements, international trade has been
liberalized after the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. They found that, under
plausible assumptions, tariff reductions indeed increase the rate of carbon leakage.
These increases however can be offset with smaller costs than the additional benefits
of freer trade by the authors’ estimation.
There are several channels through which trade affects pollutions levels.
Grossman and Krueger (1991) broke the relationship between environment and
trade into three components. The scale effect increases pollution due to increased
economic growth as a result of trade. If trade enhances economic growth, which in
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turn increases demand for energy-intensive production, CO2 emissions rise as more
fossil fuels are used in production. The technique effect refers to the changing of
production techniques as a result of liberalized trade. For example, better access
to environment-friendly technologies may be achieved in less developed countries
when foreign investment restrictions are relaxed. And finally, the composition effect
is the changes in composition of production due to specialization in activities where
countries enjoy comparative advantage.
15
3 Theoretical framework
3.1 Hoel’s model
In this chapter I will introduce Michael Hoel’s model (1996), with which Hoel analyzed
whether carbon taxes should be differentiated between different sectors in order to
mitigate possible carbon leakage and ensure effectiveness of the policy. Hoel builds
on earlier work by Markusen (1975), and generalizes Markusen’s case of a two-sector,
two-region model. Hoel’s main argument is that differentiation between sectors is
not advisable if carbon tariffs can be implemented. If tariffs are excluded from the
instruments of climate policy for some reason, differentiation becomes optimal. In the
following subsection I will show how the model works, and the analytical reasoning
behind Hoel’s arguments.
3.1.1 Consumption and production pattern
The domestic consumption vector in the model is c = (c0, c1, ...cn). The vector
represents the consumption choices of goods by a representative consumer in the
model. The goods in the model are indexed so that the first 1 + η(≤ n) goods are
traded goods, the rest being non-tradables. Welfare in the model is the function of
domestic consumption of fossil fuels (c0), and other products (c1 to cn). Domestic
utility function is thus written as
W = U(c)− E(z) (1)
where E(z) is the environmental cost of emissions from all countries. In
other words, domestic welfare grows only when products are consumed within the
country, while CO2 emissions lower welfare also when they are produced abroad. In
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a socially optimal situation the utility from consumption in home country will be
maximized with harm from global emissions taken into account.
Total emissions (z) consist of domestic consumption of fossil fuels (c0),
domestic use of fossil fuels as production inputs (v), and foreign emissions (e):
z = c0 + v + e. (2)
The reduction in domestic components of the emissions is the main intention
of a carbon tax, while carbon leakage would increase foreign emissions.
The vectorm denotes net imports, so the domestic net output is represented
by vector y ≡ c−m. Negative components of m denote exports. Since non-traded
goods are not imported, mi = 0 and domestic output equals consumption (yi = ci).
For each value of production input v, there is a set of net outputs of all goods. These
are important to include explicitly in the model, since the fossil fuel inputs affect
the environmental impact of production. Output possibilities are specified by a
transformation function of general type F (y, v) ≤ 0, where F is increasing in each
yi. The derivative Fv is smaller than zero as long as fuel input is lower than would
be efficient in absence of environmental externalities (i.e. increase in fuel use will
increase the economy’s output). Efficiency implies that F (y, v) = 0 (output is at the
production frontier) and y = c−m (domestic net output equals consumption minus
net imports), so
F (c−m, v) = 0 (3)
describes efficient combinations of net outputs and fossil fuel inputs in
production.
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Balanced trade is defined as the current account of zero, and trade is
assumed to be balanced. Therefore the monetary sum of imports minus exports
needs to equal zero:
p(m)m =
∑
i≤η
pi(m)mi = 0. (4)
Terms p(m) = (p0(m), p1(m), ..., pη(m) are international prices of traded
goods. These prices can be changed through changes in net imports.
The framework allows capital movements. If a given physical stock of capital
is denoted by xk, and the use of this capital in production by vk, net output can be
written as yk = xk − vk. Since yk = ck −mk, we get vk + ck = xk +mk. This means
that more capital must be imported when use of capital is increased in domestic
production or consumption.
Foreign carbon emissions are also assumed to depend on the net imports.
The model only considers carbon leakage that occurs as a direct consequence of
relative price changes following introduction of carbon tax. It does not capture for
example industry relocation effects or the structure of international energy markets.
Therefore foreign emissions can be written simply as
e = e(m) = f(p(m)). (5)
In the simple case, importing energy intensive goods raises their international
prices and foreign production (∂f/∂pj > 0), and thus increases emissions. Whereas
the opposite is usually true for goods which use little or no fossil fuels, since demand
for clean products shifts foreign production away from the energy intensive goods.
Hoel defines the social optimum as the vector (c,m, v) which maximizes
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welfare (1), subject to conditions (2)-(5) presented above, and mj = 0 for all non-
traded goods. Or shortly as a combination of domestic consumption, net imports
and domestic fossil fuel inputs that has the highest utility when harm from global
emissions is taken into account. Following conditions can be calculated for a social
optimum.
First, marginal rate of substitution (MRS) needs to equal marginal rate of
transformation (MRT), with environmental externality (E ′) included in the MRS.
This is the standard requirement of efficiency. The marginal environmental cost fossil
fuel use needs to be included in the MRS between fuel use and consumption of other
goods to capture the marginal loss of welfare from emission increase:
U0 − E ′
Ui
= F0
Fi
, i = 1, ..., n, (6)
(where Ui = ∂U/∂ci, Fi = ∂F/∂ci −mi etc.)
Second, emission reductions should not be costlier than the benefit from
reduced emissions is, neither should they be so undersized that emissions did more
harm than reducing them would cost. Therefore the marginal cost of reducing
emissions must equal the marginal environmental cost of emissions measured in terms
of good i:
−Fv
Fi
= E
′
Ui
, i 6= 0. (7)
Third, the following defines the relationship between the MRS in consump-
tion and international prices. MRS is adjusted to environmental externalities in
other countries from importing goods, as imports increase emissions in the rest of
the world. In other words, the ratio of two marginal import costs, adjusted by the
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terms of trade effects Ti, must equal the externality-adjusted MRS in consumption.
This reflects that the ratio of marginal import costs need to equal the ratio marginal
utilities of importing those goods, when marginal harm from emissions changes is
taken into account:
p0 + T0
pi + Ti
= (U0 − E
′)− E ′e0
Ui − E ′ei , i = 1, ..., η, (8)
where
Tj =
∑
i
mi
∂pi
∂mj
, j = 0, 1, ..., η.2 (9)
The terms Tj measure terms of trade effects of the increase in import of
good j. The terms of trade effect is here defined as the aggregate monetary cost
change of net imports in response to a change in imports of a single good. Tj is
positive for imported and negative for exported goods in the simple case where
∂pi/∂mj = 0 and ∂pj/∂mj > 0 (i 6= j) (importing more good j does not change the
international price of i, and importing j increases the price of j itself). In the more
general case where changes in net imports of one good may affect the international
prices of other goods as well (∂pi/∂mj 6= 0), this this simple relationship does not
hold.
3.1.2 Carbon taxes and tariffs in the model
Next I will explain how Hoel proposed the social optimum to be achieved by imple-
menting carbon taxes and tariffs in a competitive economy.
There is a common carbon tax θ for all users, and import tariffs or export
2∑
i from here on is shorthand of
∑n
i=0
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subsidies tj for all traded goods:
θ = E ′pi + ti
Ui
, i 6= 0, (10)
tj = Tj + θej, for j ≤ η (tradables),
tj = 0, for j > η (non-tradables).
(11)
E ′ is the marginal environmental cost measured in utility, while (pi+ ti)/Ui
is dollars per unit utility for good i, after the possible tariff has changed a good’s price
to pi + ti. It will be shown below that the carbon tax does not depend on the good i,
and carbon tax thus equals the monetary measure of the marginal environmental
cost of emissions. The tax internalizes the negative externalities from domestic
emissions, but would cause carbon leakage to occur without adoption of carbon
tariffs simultaneously.
The import tariff (or export subsidy) changes the price of j to pj + tj.
Positive tj is an import tariff for imported goods and an export subsidy for exports.
Tj measures the terms of trade effect of an increase in imports of the good j, and is
defined as in (9). The term θej measures the value of a change in foreign emissions as
a result of the marginal increase in imports of the good j. As a terms of trade effect
Tj , a change in foreign emissions ej can also be signed either positively or negatively,
since importing some goods may decrease emissions abroad in some cases. Therefore
the tariff tj can also be negative, in which case tj is an import subsidy or an export
tax.
It is worth noticing, that for a small country, or a group of countries, the
terms of trade effects (∂pi/∂mj) are close to zero, while the marginal changes in
foreign emissions (ej) may be relatively large. Therefore the level of tariff tj for good
j will only depend on the sign and magnitude of ej.
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Consumers will face the price vector (p0 + θ + t0, p1 + t1, ..., pn + tn). The
carbon tax is included in the price of fossil fuels, and carbon tariffs in the prices of
other goods. The optimal consumption vector needs to satisfy
U0
Ui
= p0 + θ + t0
pi + ti
, i = 1, ..., n, (12)
which demonstrates that the ratio of marginal utilities from consumption
of fossil fuels needs to equal the ratio between prices the consumers face.
When we combine this with (10) and (11) we get
U0
Ui
= p0 + t0
pi + ti
+ E
′
Ui
, i = 1, ..., n. (13)
which can be written
U0 − E ′
Ui
= p0 + t0
pi + ti
, i = 1, ..., n. (14)
or
pi + ti
Ui
= p0 + t0
U0 − E ′ , i = 1, ..., n. (15)
From this we can see that (pi + ti)/Ui does not depend on i (for i 6= 0).
Therefore it is proven that (10), or the level of the carbon tax is not affected by the
choice of good i, but is only determined by the marginal environmental cost.
For given prices and tariffs, producers will maximize their income, consider-
ing they need to use fossil fuels as production inputs and pay carbon tax for using
them ((p0 + t0)x− (p0 + t0 + θ)v +∑i>0(pi + ti)yi = ∑i(pi + ti)yi − θv) subject to
the efficiency condition F (y, v) = 0. From this follows:
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F0
Fi
= p0 + t0
pi + ti
, i = 1, ..., n. (16)
−Fv
Fi
= θ
pi + ti
, i = 1, ..., n. (17)
Which mean that the marginal rate of transformation between fossil fuels
and other products must equal the ratio of prices of those products.
We can see that the MRS=MRT condition (6) can be obtained by combining
(14) and (16). Therefore (17) can now be written as
−Fv
Fi
= E
′
Ui
, i 6= 0, (18)
equivalent to (7): marginal cost of reducing emissions must equal marginal
environmental cost of emissions.
(10) and (12) give
(U0 − E ′)− E ′e0
Ui − E ′ei =
(U0 − E ′)
(
1− θe0
p0+t0
)
Ui
(
1− θei
pi+ti
) , (19)
furthermore, we may insert (11) and (12) into the right hand side to obtain
U0 − E ′ − E ′e0
Ui − E ′ei =
p0 + T0
pi + Ti
, fori = 1, ..., η, (20)
equivalent to the condition (8)
The results above show that social optimum conditions (6)-(8)derived in
the previous subsection can be achieved in the competitive economy with the taxes
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and tariffs defined in (10) and (11).
3.2 The optimum without tariffs
Hoel also analyzes the situation where the use of tariffs is ruled out. To simplify the
case, he assumes that all international prices are fixed, all goods are tradable, and
that there is no domestic production of fossil fuels. The only endogenous consumer
price in this simplified version of the model is the price of fossil fuels. The vector
y˜ = (y1, . . . , yn) denotes the vector of net outputs for the n non-fuel goods. Whereas
vectors for fuel use are v˜ = (v1, . . . , vn) and c˜ = (c1, . . . , cn). Thus, the net imports
are given by:
m0 = c0 +
∑
i
vi; mi = ci − yi, for i > 0.3 (21)
First part of which denotes the imports of fossil fuels for consumption
(c0) and for production inputs (vi). Since there is no domestic production of fossil
fuels, all of domestic emissions are included in m0. Foreign emissions are still
e(m0,m1, . . . ,mη), but in this case government chooses differentiated carbon taxes
(θ0, θ = (θ0, θ1, . . . , θn) instead of tariffs to maximize welfare. Households face the
price vector (p0+θ0, p1 . . . , pn). The carbon taxes do not affect the prices of products
other than fossil fuels themselves, since international prices are fixed and there is no
tariffs to create a difference between international and domestic prices. If a domestic
producer would try to raise its prices because of the tax, it would simply lose its
market share to foreign producers. Thus the indirect utility function is
3In this section
∑
i is shorthand for
∑n
i=1
24
V (θ0, I ) = maxU(c0, c)
subject to (p0 + θ0)c0 +
∑
i
pici ≤ I
(where I is household income)
(22)
Which gives the maximum attainable utility for the consumers, given their
income I and the carbon tax on fossil fuel consumption. The limiting condition
simply means that total amount of consumption at the given price level, and tax on
fuels, cannot exceed the aggregate household income.
The properties of the indirect utility function function V are
∂V
∂c0
= −c0λ; λ ≡ ∂V
∂I
. (23)
This is so called Roy’s Identity, which states that the demand for fossil fuels
is the ratio between partial derivatives of the indirect utility function.
The profit function defines how firms profits are determined by prices
and outputs subtracted by the cost of fossil fuel inputs. The cost of fossil fuels in
production includes the international price of the fuel and the differentiated carbon
tax:
pi(θ) = max
∑
i
piyi −
∑
i
(p0 + θi)vi (24)
with the properties
∂pi
∂θi
= −vi. (25)
I.e. increase in carbon tax for a certain good decreases the use of fossil fuels
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as a production input for that good. The vector of outputs and fuel inputs (y, v) is
constrained by the set of feasible technologies.
The household income I consists of profits and reimbursed taxes. To keep
the analysis simple, it is assumed that the carbon tax is distributed entirely to the
consumers:
I = pi(θ) + θ0c0(θ0, I) +
∑
i
θivi(θi) (26)
Following the previous expressions, the welfare W can be written as
W = V (θ0, I)−E(c0(θ0, I)+
∑
i
vi(θ)+e(c0(θ0, I)+
∑
i
vi(θ), c1(θ0, I)−y1(θ), ..., cn(θ0, I)−yn(θ)))
(27)
Or, phrased in words, expressed as indirect utility from consumption minus
environmental externality determined by domestic use of fossil fuels in consumption
and production inputs and net imports.
The optimal level of carbon taxes θi to maximize W can be calculated by
taking a lagrangian:
L = V (θ0, I)− E(c0(θ0, I) +
∑
i
vi(θ)
+e(c0(θ0, I) +
∑
i
vi(θ), c1(θ0, I)− y1(θ), ..., cn(θ0, I)− yn(θ)
+µ[pi(θ) + θ0c0(θ0, I) +
∑
i
θivi(θi)− I]
(28)
The first-order conditions are
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∂L
∂I
= λ− E ′ ·
[
(1 + e0)
∂c0
∂I
+
∑
i>0
ei
∂ci
∂I
]
+ µ
[
θ0
∂c0
∂I
− 1
]
= 0,
∂L
∂θ0
= −λc0 − E ′ ·
[
(1 + e0)
∂c0
∂θ
+
∑
i>0
ei
∂ci
∂θ0
]
+ µ
[
c0 + θ0
∂c0
∂θ0
− 1
]
= 0,
∂L
∂θj
= −E ′ ·
[
(1 + e0)
∑
i
∂vi
∂θj
−∑
i
ei
∂yi
∂θj
]
+ µ+
∑
i
θi
∂vi
∂θj
= 0.
(29)
By multiplying the first FOC by c0 and adding it to the second FOC we get
−E ′ ·
[
(1+ e0)
(∂c0
∂θ0
+ c0
∂c0
∂I
)
+
∑
i>0
ei
( ci
∂θ0
+ c0
∂ci
∂I
)]
+µθ0
[∂c0
∂θ0
+ c0
∂ci
∂
I
]
= 0 (30)
The compensated demand derivatives for all i are given by
( ∂ci
∂θ0
)
u=u¯
= ∂ci
∂θ0
+ c0
∂ci
∂I
(31)
When (30) is divided by (31) we get the carbon tax for domestic consumption
of fossil fuel:
θ0 =
E ′
µ
·
1 + e0 +
∑
i ei
(
∂ci
∂θ0
)
u=u¯(
∂c0
∂θ0
)
u=u¯
 (32)
The last FOC can be rewritten as
− E ′ ·
[
(1 + e0)
∑
i
∂vi
θj
−∑
i
ei
∂yi
∂θj
]
+ µ θj
αj
∑
i
∂vi
∂θj
= 0 (33)
since α is defined by
αj =
θj
∑
i
∂vi
∂θj∑
i θi
∂vi
∂θj
(34)
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dividing (33) by ∑i(∂vi)/∂θi) we get θj that maximizes W :
θj = αj · E
′
µ
·
1 + e0 +
∑
i ei
(
− ∂yi
∂θj
)
∑
i
∂vi
∂θj
 (35)
Coefficient αj measures the ratio between marginal changes in tax revenues
from carbon tax for product j and aggregate carbon taxes from all products (except
fossil fuel) from increasing carbon tax for product j.
The term E ′/µ in (32) and (35) represents the marginal cost of CO2 emis-
sions in money terms (marginal environmental cost in terms of utility divided by a
hypothetical transfer of money). 1+ e0 gives the direct effect of the per unit increase
in domestic fuel use on global emissions. Thus (E ′/µ)(1 + e0) gives the marginal
environmental cost of the direct effect of increased domestic fuel use. The last terms
of (32) and (35) represent the indirect effects on global emissions resulting from
changes in net imports of non-fuel goods.
The nominator in the last term of (32) is the compensated direct price
derivative of the demand for fossil fuels, and thus negative. The numerator captures
the effect of a compensated increase in the consumption of fuels on foreign emissions.
The nominator in the last terms of (35) measures the change a rise of fuel
price in sector j causes in the total fuel input of all sectors. The numerator of the last
term is the effect a rise in the price in fuel price in sector j has on foreign emissions.
Since this term clearly differs between sectors, θj i.e. the optimal carbon tax needs
to also differentiate. Unlike in the case with optimal tariffs, the relationship between
the sign and size of ej and the optimal carbon tax for sector j is not straightforward.
One can also see by comparing (32) and (35) to (10) and (11) that the amount of
information needed to calculate optimal tax levels θ0 and θj is much larger than that
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needed to calculate the uniform carbon tax and differentiated tariffs.
3.2.1 Summary of the Hoel’s model
As we have seen in the previous subsections, Hoel’s model shows that carbon taxes
ought not to be differentiated between sectors in carbon tariffs can be used. The
domestic carbon tax should be equivalent to marginal environmental cost of emissions
in monetary terms, while the optimal tariff should be the domestic price of carbon
scaled to the marginal change of foreign emissions in response to marginal increase
in imports of a good. However, if tariffs cannot be applied, the optimal solution
requires differentiation between sectors, even with the simplifications used in that
case. Even though calculation of the optimal levels of tariffs requires a large amount of
information, the information needed for optimally differentiated taxes is significantly
larger. Furthermore, there is no simple relationship between for example fossil fuel
intensity and the optimal carbon taxes for different sectors. Therefore, based on
Hoel’s model, there are no good reasons not to implement carbon tariffs along with
the undifferentiated carbon tax. To further demonstrate how the model works, I will
provide some examples with numerical approximations for variables. The following
calculations should not be taken as accurate, and only provide crude approximations
for the sake of an example.
The social cost of a ton of carbon dioxide is usually considered to be between
€10 and €50, depending on discount rate (see e.g. Bijgaart, Gerlagh, and Liski, 2016).
Iron and steel industry is an example of a sector that would be highly susceptible to
carbon leakage. For example Fischer and Fox (2012) estimated the leakage rate (the
change in foreign emissions) for iron and steel industry in the OECD countries to
be 58 percent without any adjustment policies to mitigate the leakage. Depending
on energy source and production method among others, carbon intensity of steel
production is around 1-2 tonnes of CO2 per ton of crude steel (Hasanbeigi et al.,
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2016). If we assume the emissions embodied in the steel production to be 1.5 tonnes
of CO2 per ton of steel, and the social cost of a ton of carbon to be €25, the carbon
tax for a ton of crude steel would be 1.5 ∗ £25 = 37.5.
For a small country the terms of trade effect would be near zero, since
changes in its net imports would not have noticeable effects on international prices.
So the calculation of the tariff would not include the terms of trade component.
The price of steel on international markets was around €300 in early 2017 (Trading
Economics: Steel n.d.). By inserting these exemplar numbers into (10), the optimal
carbon tariff for a ton of steel would be:
tsteel = 0 + 37.5 ∗ 0.58 = 21.75. (36)
Compared to for example to paper, pulp and print industry which, according
to Fischer and Fox (2012), would have leakage rate of 2 percent, steel would have
much higher tariff level. Assuming again that the country is small and the terms of
trade effect is negligible, a ton of pulp would have the following tariff4:
tpulp = 0 + 7.5 ∗ 0.02 = 0.15. (37)
In percentage terms this would mean around 7 percent tariff for steel imports,
and below 0.02 (with the price of pulp aroud €800 per tonne) percent tariff for pulp
imports. From these examples we can see that in a small country, the optimal
carbon tariffs would be minimal for pulp compared to steel. For a larger country
the calculation would change, since the terms of trade component would affect the
calculation as changes in imports would affect international prices of goods.
4It is assumed that pulp production produces around 0.3 tonnes of CO2 per ton of pulp (magnitude
checked from Vos and Newell, 2009). This equals a carbon tax of €7.5 per tonne.
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In the case without tariffs the carbon tax for a ton of steel the calculation
would be far more complicated, as it would require estimates about what effects the
carbon tax on one sector would have on every sector, in addition to indirect effects
on emissions from changes in net imports after the tax would be set.
3.2.2 What is missing in Hoel’s model?
Even though Hoel’s model provides a strong argument for carbon tariffs as a second-
best option in climate policy, there are many possibly significant factors the analysis
does not capture. For example, bootstrapping and free-riding effects analyzed by
B. R. Copeland and M. S. Taylor (2004) are clearly out of scope of the model, as
well as any other technology or policy-making related factors. The coalition that sets
the tax and the tariffs is assumed to be exogenously given and fixed, and there are
no considerations of the policy response in foreign countries.
Hoel’s model optimizes welfare only for the home country. Therefore it does
not take into account possible negative effects of tariffs to the rest of the world, and
thus the global cost-effectiveness of the policy. This seems to be the main reason,
why carbon tariffs are not considered to be very good solution in the global scheme in
some studies (Böhringer, J. Carbone, and Rutherford, 2016). Hoel himself argues in
the article that any country can avoid the negative effects of the tariffs by joining the
cooperating climate coalition. There is a counter-argument for this however: abuse of
terms-of-trade effects by carbon tariffs may legitimate manipulation of terms-of-trade
effects on the pretext of other issues as well. This argument was raised by Böhringer,
Lange, and Rutherford (2014) who decomposed the differentiation efforts similar to
Hoel into leakage and terms-of-trade motives.
While Hoel argues that the information needed for optimal tariff design
is smaller than that needed for optimal tax design, the amount of data available
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for practical policy design might anyways be much smaller than the optimal design
would require. The data required for truly optimal policy design following the model
should include detailed and accurate information on the emission levels of different
products in other countries. Furthermore, equal tariff levels for all producers of
the same good would not place any incentives for foreign producers to lower their
own emissions. However, as Hoel mentioned, these arguments would also apply
to carbon price differentiation. Therefore Hoel’s model can be considered a basis
for policy design. The practical questions about the superiority of tariffs rise from
quantitative estimates of whether the benefits from tariffs are significant, and whether
tax differentiation and tariffs have large differences in their impacts and in their
practical implementation.
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4 Studies and results
In this section I will briefly explain how carbon leakage is studied in the economics
literature, and review the main results from the studies.
4.1 Background
The basis for most of the estimates for carbon leakage rate has been the allocation
of greenhouse gas emission reduction targets determined in the Kyoto Protocol.
The economic studies of carbon leakage typically classify countries into two groups:
Kyoto Agreement Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Annex I countries are those
that should have reduced their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2012.
Respectively non-Annex I countries are those without binding targets for emissions
in the Kyoto Agreement.
The only major region to place a price on carbon has been the European
Union with its Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). EU has tried to prevent carbon
leakage effects by allocating extra allowances to the sectors deemed most vulnerable
to it. More about EU ETS in A. D. Ellerman, F. J. Convery, and De Perthuis (2010).
4.2 Computable general equilibrium models
The estimates of carbon leakage are typically based on multi-region multi-sector
computable general equilibrium models (CGEs). CGEs use realistic economic data
to solve numerically the equilibrium of supply, demand and prices in a set of markets.
They are a tool for a kind of semi-empirical analysis that uses mostly empirically
gathered data to analyze changes in economy by the microeconomic foundations
of Walrasian equilibrium. A CGE model handles the economy as a circular flow of
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commodities between firms and households, possibly across multiple regions. Factor
inputs like labor and capital are used by firms to provide goods and services to
households, which in turn supply firms with labor. A multi-region model used in
modeling carbon leakage also contains flows of imports and exports between different
regions. A CGE solves a set of prices by employing three conditions: market clearance,
zero profits and income balance. (Wing, 2004)
In a model an external shock, usually the change in the emissions policy
when carbon leakage is studied, changes relative prices, which in turn affects trade
flows through price elastic supply and demand. A CGE model can include data
from inputs and outputs and combine them with assumptions on market structure
and elasticities. A dozen regions can be included in a model. Common primary
resources in models are labor, capital and fossil-fuel resources. Figure 1 provides
a rough depiction of a circular flow of economy in a CGE model. Fossil fuels can
be categorized into oil, coal and gas for example. Production of commodities is
captured by constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions. A model however
cannot include all effects in the world that affect carbon leakage, nor can it include
all the features of Kyoto Agreement and other international policies to reduce CO2
emissions. (Böhringer, J. Carbone, and Rutherford, 2016)
As discussed in subsection 2.4, carbon leakage typically consists of two
components in these models: non-energy market channel and energy market channel,
or terms of trade effect and fuel price effect (Elliott and Fullerton, 2014). The first
of these effects provides a competitive edge to producers in non-abating countries
depending on demand elasticities of the products. Another one encourages more
intensive fuel consumption abroad as international fuel prices fall. The framework is
thus typically very similar to the simplified version of Hoel’s model. Other effects like
more nuanced view on industry relocation and market structures have been included
in CGE models by some studies, but in most of the models used by studies, leakage
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Figure 1:
Figure 2: Flow chart of a CGE model
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consists primarily of the two main effects mentioned above.
4.2.1 Main findings of the models
Most estimates indicate the carbon leakage rate to be roughly between 5 and 30
percent, usually below 20 percent, but these results are often highly sensitive to
change of assumptions and may change considerably if a new feature is introduced
into a model. Burniaux and Joaquim Oliveira Martins (2012) summarized previous
estimates of leakage rates associated with the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
in 2000. These estimates ranged from 2% to 21% (Light, Kolstad, and Rutherford,
1999; Bollen, Manders, and Timmer, 1999; M. Babiker, Reilly, and Jacoby, 2000;
Manne and Richels, 2000; Burniaux and Martins, 2000). Results may vary from
negative leakage to assessing unilateral policies totally counterproductive with leakage
of over 100%. Additionally, all the limitations of the CGE models in general apply
to these results.
A summary of estimates for carbon leakage in CGE studies is presented in
Table 1. The leakage rate presented is the one from researchers’ standard scenario,
if there is one, or as a range obtained with different plausible assumptions. The
different results should not be simply taken as different estimates for the leakage rate
universally, but the studies differ by their assumptions, regions involved, timeline and
the emissions mitigation schemes they try to assess. The region used in a study is the
Annex I countries of the Kyoto Protocol (Nations, n.d.), unless else is mentioned. It
is worth noticing that the leakage rate is smaller if the coalition is larger, since there
are less countries where emissions can leak to. The numbers are presented rather as
descriptions of the estimated magnitude than accurate predictions. The only results
show that leakage rate is quite moderate in all other studies but in M. Babiker (2005).
Though aggregate rates are modest, certain sectors are estimated to be significantly
more susceptible to leakage than others.
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Fore example, Paltsev (2001) assesses sectoral and regional determinants of
the leakage. He uses a static multi-sector, multi-regional model. Paltsev decomposes
the leakage to regional and sectoral level contributions. He finds that the Kyoto
Protocol leads to carbon leakage rate of around 10 percent for the baseline values, but
higher for chemical and metal industries. However, he also argues that exemptions
from carbon taxes of any sector are no justified because they would lower the
welfare based on his model. In Paltsev’s model degree of regional and sectoral data
disaggregation or international capital mobility do not change the rate of leakage
significantly.
As the outlier among the estimates, M. Babiker (2005) finds two sources
that may strongly contribute to offshore production and carbon leakage effect: the
pro-competitive effect of carbon abatement policies in initially monopolized industries
and the effect of entry and exit of firms in such industries. He uses a seven-commodity,
seven-region applied general equilibrium model to model strategic interaction between
energy-intensive companies through spatial Cournot oligopolies with free entry and
exit to capture these effects. The locational effects in Babiker’s model are small with
differentiated (Armington assumption) products and larger with homogenous products
(Heckscher-Ohlin case). The difference between the assumptions is substantial: e.g.
the fall in number of firms in OECD is 2% or 53.3% depending on the assumption.
With Heckscher-Ohlin assumptions and increasing returns to scale carbon leakage
in this model can be over 100%. Previous studies had found the carbon leakage
rate resulting from Kyoto Protocol like policy to be between 5% and 25%. Babiker
argues in his study that if industry relocation with economies of scale, market power
and richer representation of international trade is taken into the model, the scope of
carbon leakage might be much larger. (M. Babiker, 2005)
Gerlagh and Kuik (2007) added the possibility of international technology
spillovers to a large CGE model. Abatement policies may change the direction of
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technological country both domestically and internationally. These developments in
environmental technologies may diffuse to non-abatement countries. The authors
found that even modest level of technological spillovers may reduce the leakage from
the baseline estimate of 17 percent significantly, and lead to even negative leakage
rates.
Different studies have analyzed effects of regulation in different regions of
the world. The leakage rate is not the same for different regions. Böhringer, Lange,
and Rutherford (2014) estimated the leakage rate for the EU to be over 35 percent,
while the estimate for the United States was only slightly over 15 percent. There are
couple of reasons for this. First, the EU is relatively more open economy, its exports
and imports constitute a larger share of the economy in the EU than in the US.
This is specifically the case for emission-intensive goods and fossil fuels. The EU is a
major net exporter of energy-intensive goods, while it imports a large share of fossil
fuels it consumes. Additionally, EU’s emission-intensive industries are relatively less
emission-intensive than those of the US. This causes a larger per production-unit
increase in global emissions if production moves away from the EU.
There are plenty of uncertainties in the results of the models; they may
be sensitive to uncertainties in estimates of certain paramaters, and a CGE model
cannot capture all of the factors involved. The leakage rate is not probably linear
in relation to the emission reduction target. Lowering GHG emissions may become
more expensive when the reduction target is tightened. Therefore the leakage rate
may be higher with tighter reduction targets than those used in the studies.
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Study Estimate of leakage in
base scenario
Notes
M. Babiker, Reilly, and Ja-
coby, 2000
6%
M. Babiker, 2005 30% to 130% Includes industry relocation ef-
fects. In higher estimates fuels
assumed to be Heckscher-Ohlin
goods
Bernard and Vielle, 2009 Below 1% Assesses EU’s "Energy-Climate"
directive
Bollen, Manders, and Tim-
mer, 1999
9% to 24% Increases over time
Burniaux and Martins, 2000 2%
Burniaux and Joaquim
Oliveira Martins, 2012
2% to 4%
Elliott, Foster, et al., 2010 20%
Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007 -16% to 17% Technology spillovers added
Ho, Morgenstern, and Shih,
2008
26% Assesses a unilateral policy by the
US
Light, Kolstad, and Ruther-
ford, 1999
20%
Kuik and Hofkes, 2010 11% Assesses the EU ETS
Manne and Richels, 2000 10% to 15%
Oliveira-Martins, Burniaux,
and J. P. Martin, 1992
1% to 16%
Paltsev, 2001 10%
Table 1: Estimates of leakage rate in CGE studies
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4.3 Key parameters
As I mentioned before, the results from CGE models can be very sensitive to
certain assumptions. In this subsection I will explore which are the most important
parameters in the models for the results regarding leakage rate. A major choice in
assumptions discussed in literature is whether goods are considered Heckscher-Ohlin
(H-O) goods or Armington goods. To put it simply, the important distinction between
the two is that with H-O goods produced in different countries are homogeneous,
whereas Armington goods are differentiated, i.e. they are not perfect substitutes to
each others.
Burniaux and Joaquim Oliveira Martins (2012) provide sensitivity analysis
to assess how leakage rates react to changes in parameter values. The authors find in
their analysis that the key parameter in the results obtained by the GREEN model
they employed is the supply elasticity of coal. With high supply elasticity leakage
rates are quite low and stable, but with low elasticity leakage rates can be very high
(40%). In practice this means that the leakage can get high if supply of coal does
not respond to lower prices caused by carbon regulation. Totally inelastic supply
of fossil fuels would make the reduction of emissions impossible, since all the fuel
would simply be consumed elsewhere when its price would drop.
They also find that product substitution in non-energy markets has a quite
small impact on leakage rates, so choice between Heckscher-Ohlin and Armington
assumptions is not significant in explaining differences between models. The impact of
capital mobility is also small: for moderate values of Armington elasticity, abatement
in Annex 1 countries induces a current account surplus through lower energy imports,
which again results in real exchange rate appreciation and inflow of capital. Only for
high values of Armington elasticity there may be small real exchange rate deterioration.
(Burniaux and Joaquim Oliveira Martins, 2012)
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The authors’ findings suggest that the elasticity of coal supply plays a
critical role in determining carbon leakage, while oil supply elasticity plays only a
minor role. With elastic coal supply, coal markets’ integration plays a minor role,
but with less elastic supply, leakage rates may rise high ( 60%) if coal markets are
integrated. However, this result would include huge shifts in coal exports, which is
probably unrealistic. International capital mobility and differentiation of final goods
play less significant roles. They also argue that the shape of production function
is important in this matter. When possibilities for inter-fuel and/or inter-factor
substitution are greater than previously reported in the literature, leakage rates
may be high. According to the authors, there is little empirical evidence concerning
supply elasticity of carbon, for which their results are highly sensitive. The few
empirical estimates are quite mixed as well: for example, Beck, Jolly, and Loncar
(1991) estimated the aggregate elasticity to be quite low: from 0.4 in the short term
to 1.9 in the long run, whereas Mellish (1998) estimated it to be high, around 7.
(Burniaux and Joaquim Oliveira Martins, 2012)
Since the elasticity of coal supply is deemed to be the key parameter in
assessing the magnitude of carbon leakage, the structure of international coal markets
plays a significant role. Light, Kolstad, and Rutherford (1999) argued that assumption
of regional differentiation may lead to underestimation of the potential leakage effects.
If coal markets are highly integrated and the supply elasticity is low, leakage rate
might be higher than most of the estimates indicate. However, this development
could be prevented by setting a tax on coal exports.
M. Babiker (2005) states that leakage rate can reach very high level if
energy-intensive goods are modeled as Heckscher-Ohlin goods, and company entry
and exit -effects are taken into account. He argued that it is reasonable to assume
that energy-intensive goods will eventually transform into homogenic goods, at least
in the long run. This is an assumption not shared, at least in the time horizon of the
41
models, by most other scholars. M. Babiker also finds two sources that may strongly
contribute to offshore production and carbon leakage effect: the pro-competitive
effect of carbon abatement policies in initially monopolized industries and the effect
of entry and exit of firms in such industries.
In conclusion, elasticity of coal supply and integration of integration of the
international coal markets are the main parameters that have really large effects
on the overall estimates of carbon leakage in CGE models. Other parameters, like
Armington elasticites and production sunstitutions play a smaller role, but contribute
to the variance between results. However, there are other factors that these models
ignore, but might be important for the leakage rate in reality.
4.4 Findings from analytical models
In addition to “large” CGE models that try to model effects in the world economy
with large amounts of data used as variables, mechanisms of carbon leakage have
been studied with simplified GE models to assess more particular attributes of the
effects and parameters often ignored by the larger CGEs. I will present a short review
of different insights these "smaller" models have contributed to the discussion about
carbon leakage.
B. Copeland and M. Taylor (2005) decompose a country’s best response in
a general equilibrium model into three components: free-riding effect, carbon leakage
(a substitution effect in their context) and an income effect. They show that although
in the case of closed economies home and rest-of-the-world emissions are strategic
substitutes, under free trade they may be strategic complements. In other words,
unilateral emission reductions in one group of countries may create self-interested
reductions in others as well. The authors also show that unlike in autarky, under free
trade of goods rigid emission reduction rules can create globally efficient abatement
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of emissions. Their third result is that pollution permit trade across countries may
create unintended consequences through their effects on goods prices. According to
the authors, previous models had included a detailed model of the energy sector but
almost ignored the role of international trade.
While most models measuring carbon leakage assume the development of
technology as constant, Di Maria and Van der Werf (2008) analyze the leakage in a
setting where the price on carbon increases incentives to develop clean technologies.
They showed that when the development of technology is directed via carbon pricing,
leakage rates might be lower. The effect is strengthened, if the elasticity of demand
for carbon-based technology is high. In other words, if demand for carbon-based
technologies falls significantly when the clean techniques become relatively cheaper,
it might be profitable to lower emissions even in non-regulated regions.
Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2011)) proposed a Abatement Resource
Effect implemented later in CIM-EARTH global multi-region general equilibrium
model by Elliott and Fullerton (2014). As described in chapter 2, adaptation to
carbon regulation may draw factors of production away from the carbon-intensive
sectors and regions. This depends on how easily the economy can shift away from the
carbon-intensive production and, on the other hand away from the regulated sectors
or regions. They found that the negative leakage depends on the ability of consumers
to change into untaxed goods and the ability of firms to substitute emissions into
labor or capital. In typical CGE setting ARE cannot occur since labor and capital are
assumed to be immobile across regions and thus taxed firms cannot draw resources
from untaxed sectors. J. C. Carbone, 2013 also added ARE to an applied general
equilibrium model and found aggregate carbon leakage rates of around zero to twenty
percent, depending on fuel supply elasticities and substitution elasticities between
fossil fuels, and substitution elasticities between capital and labor, and energy goods.
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4.5 Empirical evidence?
There does not seem to have been empirical efforts to assess the magnitude of carbon
leakage. This is partly because it is extremely difficult to build a sound econometric
research setting, but also because not many large-scale unilateral policies have been
adopted this far. European Union’s emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) is probably
the only large enough measure to be studied. The few empirical studies (Reinaud,
2008, F. Convery, D. Ellerman, and De Perthuis, 2008) did not find effects on imports
in aluminium or cement industries from the first phase (2005-2007) of the EU ETS.
Similar results were obtained by Branger, Quirion, and Chevallier, 2013 in their
time-series analysis. However, these results are quite limited as those industries that
are most prone to carbon leakage have been protected by allocating them larger
share of free permits. Additionally, the price of emission permits has been quite low
in the EU ETS this far, so the potential for carbon leakage has not been that large.
Some empirical studies have been made of the Pollution Haven Hypothesis
concerning other pollutants. For example Cherniwchan (2017) found significant
effects on the emissions of three common pollutants in US factories, particulate
matter, lead and toxic chemicals, as a result of NAFTA agreement between the USA,
Mexico and Canada. It is doubtful that these results can be generalized to CO2
emissions though.
Dechezleprı et al. (2014) studied in their recent paper the impact of EU ETS
on the geographical distribution of carbon emissions within multinational companies.
They found no evidence that the ETS would have caused displacement of emissions
from Europe to the rest of the world. They used the data from the Carbon Disclosure
Project (CDP) and compared growth rates of multinational companies’ EU and
non-EU emissions, and examined firm-level changes in the share of emissions within
the EU. Neither of these estimates provided any evidence that there would have
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been any relocation effects as a result of the EU ETS.
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5 Policy lessons to be drawn?
In this section I will review what policy measures have been proposed to prevent
carbon leakage, how they are assessed in the literature, and how they relate to Hoel’s
model presented in chapter 3.
5.1 Possible policies to mitigate carbon leakage
There are, broadly speaking, two main categories of carbon leakage prevention
measures: Border Tax (or Carbon) Adjustments (BTAs, or BCAs) and domestic
carbon price differentiation. Hoel’s model covered both of them on general level.
BTAs include any kinds of adjustments made on prices of imports and/or exports
on the border, like import taxes or export rebates. Carbon price differentiation may
be implemented for example by differentiating carbon taxes, as in Hoel’s case, or by
allocating free emission permits, as is the case within EU ETS. Based solely on Hoel’s
(1996) model, one could easily argue that an undifferentiated carbon tax combined
with differentiated carbon tariffs would be the perfect solution for unilateral climate
policy in absence of global regulation. Hoel’s assertion has got some support from
a numerical model by M. H. Babiker and Rutherford, 2005, which confirmed the
result that border taxes should be preferred over sectoral exemptions. However, in
practice adoption of carbon tariffs would not be that simple, and there has been
some counter-arguments against tariffs in the literature.
BTAs are the most often proposed solution to prevent carbon leakage, as a
second-best alternative for climate change policy after global price for GHG emissions
(e.g. Paltsev, 2001). BCAs can include border taxes or tariffs, export or import
subsidies, mandatory emissions allowance purchases for importers, or embedded
carbon product standards. A BTA can embody the full emission externality of an
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import/export, in this case it is called Full Border Adjustment (FBA). In addition
to leveling the competition between domestic and foreign producers, tariffs could
also lower industry relocation, as outsourced production could not avoid carbon
regulation if it is going to be imported to the original home country.
As discussed in the theory chapter, Hoel (1996) showed in his article,
when optimal export and import tariffs can be used, carbon taxes should not be
differentiated across sectors. But also that differentiation is an optimal policy if
tariffs cannot be implemented. Hoel does not find a good reason to rule out use of
tariffs. Although information needed to define optimal levels of tariffs is large, it
would be even larger for calculation of optimally differentiated carbon taxes.
Domestic differentiation in pricing of carbon is in Hoel’s model and more
broadly in literature the third-best solution, mostly considered because tariffs and
other BTAs are not practically adoptable. In reality, differentiation of some sort has
been the main tool in leakage prevention. Even though it has not been implemented
by directly differentiating the price of carbon, but by handing out free emission
permits, as in the EU ETS and New Zealand’s and California’s cap-and-trade systems.
There are also differences in how free allocations have been distributed: in the EU
ETS that has been done based on capacity, while in California and New Zealand the
basis has been output (Meunier, Ponssard, and Quirion, 2014).
A common issue with all differentiation of carbon pricing is that the terms-
of-trade motive encourages countries to increase taxation for energy-intensive goods
that are exported, and decrease them for the dirty goods that are imported. If the
regulating countries are compelled to compensate the negative terms-of-trade effects
to other countries, unilateral abatement becomes much costlier for the regulating
countries. So there is evidence that tariffs may be less cost-effective solution than
plain carbon pricing, if global cost-effectiveness is considered. (Böhringer, Lange,
and Rutherford, 2014)
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5.2 Evidence on border adjustments
A CGE analysis by Böhringer et al. suggests that while adoption of embodied carbon
tariffs (meaning the taxation of carbon emissions is embodied in imported goods)
would make global climate policy slightly more effective, a much larger effect would
be shift in the cost burden from OECD countries to developing world. The authors
claim that justification for carbon tariffs as a global policy option is poor, but that
for OECD countries it might appear as an attractive option to mitigate their own
costs. So, from a global income distribution point of view, the tariffs would be a poor
policy choice. This view was also supported by a meta-analysis of BCAs in CGE
models by Böhringer, Balistreri, and Rutherford (2012). The explanation for poor
cost-effectiveness increases from BCAs was that tariffs applied at the industry-average
levels of emissions do not incentivize individual foreign producers to mitigate their
emissions in any remarkable way. (Böhringer, J. Carbone, and Rutherford, 2016)
The authors (Böhringer, J. Carbone, and Rutherford, 2016) also argue that
levying the tariff on the full carbon content of traded goods would decrease the
cost effectiveness of the global emission reductions. This would happen because the
producers would re-route the carbon-intensive production to other markets. They use
the optimal tariff design introduced by Hoel (1996), and discussed in the theory section
of this thesis, as a second scenario to assess carbon tariffs with their CGE model. In
addition to Hoel’s design and the fully embodied carbon tariffs, they also studied
the effects of two less comprehensive tariff designs: one with only direct emissions
included, and another with direct emissions and electricity input. They found that
these simpler designs would capture most of the benefits of Hoel’s design. All three
designs with less than fully embodied carbon reduced leakage significantly less than
fully embodied tariffs, while their cost-effectiveness was substantially stronger.
Fischer and Fox (2012) compared four different types of policies that could
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prevent degradation of competitiveness as a result of carbon pricing by employing
a two-good, two-country, partial equilibrium model. The policy measures analyzed
were border charges on imports, border rebates for exports, full border adjustments,
and domestic output-based rebating (OBR). They found none of these policies was
effective to enhance the integrity of global climate policies, so according to this
analysis, leakage prevention measures would not do much from the environmental
point of view, but would mostly work as a tool to ensure competitiveness (measured
by domestic production and net exports) of domestic industries.
The authors’ analytical model itself provides little understanding on which
policies would be most effective in practice. The import tax will be more effective
than export rebate if the net emissions reductions from fewer imports exceed the
net emissions displacement by additional exports caused by the rebates. Full border
adjustment dominates these both if they are both effective in themselves. If one is
ineffective, the other is more effective than the full adjustment. Output-based rebate
on the other hand is effective if the displaced foreign emissions are larger than the
additional home emissions. It is more effective than full border adjustment if the
change in home emissions is larger than the change in different import levels.
When the authors (Fischer and Fox, 2012) used a CGE model to parametrize
their analytical model, and study the effects of different policies sector by sector,
they found that FBAs are most effective in avoiding net export losses, whereas OBR
is usually the most effective to avoid production losses. These results are sensitive
to policy assumptions and underlying parameters however. They also found that
the model would give different recommendations for different regions of the world.
Overall, the authors propose that the FBAs would be the most effective policy in
most cases, but OBRs would have higher compatibility with the international trade
law while maintaining most of the benefits of the FBAs.
McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2009) also examine border taxes by a detailed
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CGE model. Their result suggest that, for the largest part of the economy, border
adjustments would be very small, and would not remarkably affect carbon leakage,
nor do much to protect domestic industries. The small leakage reductions would
be offset by weakened economy in the global level, since international trade would
be negatively affected. For some particularly exposed sectors like aluminium, the
adjustments would be significant, but in the large scale, McKibbin and Wilcoxen
expect administrative complexity and trade obstruction to offset the small benefits
border adjustments could have.
Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan (2016) explored industry dynamics of cement
markets for four different policy designs: permit auctioning, grandfathering (allocation
of permits based on historic emissions or other predetermined criteria), dynamic
allocation updating (allocation of permits based on output in the previous period),
and border tax adjustments. Since cement industry is one of the largest sources of
GHG emissions, and often highly concentrated, it is an important case to study. The
authors argued that it is difficult to predict effects of climate change policies on highly
concentrated and emission intensive sectors, such as cement industry. In addition to
the problem of carbon leakage, tight regulations may cause problems with the use of
market power by some companies. A policy that fully internalizes the externality is
not necessarily optimal if the policy distorts competition even more in an already
concentrated industry. The specific policy implementation and assumed social cost
of carbon heavily affect which policy choice is the most suitable one. If the social
cost of carbon is assumed low (below $40), market based solutions where domestic
producers fully internalize emission externalities would reduce domestic economic
surplus more than emission reductions would increase welfare. In these cases, a
combination of emission penalty and production incentives would produce a better
outcome domestically. When carbon leakage is taken into account, BTAs are clearly
the most cost-effective way to reduce emissions from the point of domestic welfare,
but Fowlie et al. also point out that there might be practical barriers regarding their
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implementation.
Helm, Hepburn, and Ruta (2012) argue from a game theory perspective that
BCAs could act as a catalyst to boost the international climate policy development.
A BCA on a certain energy-intensive sector could put pressure on other countries to
adopt their own carbon pricing schemes and/or BCAs. This could eventually lead
to a sectoral agreement about carbon prices on an international level. The sectoral
agreement on one sector could in turn encourage policy focus to next sectors where
significant gains could be achieved.
Kuik and Hofkes (2010) studied the impacts of possible border adjustments
set to mitigate leakage effects of the EU ETS in a multi-region CGE model. Specifi-
cally, they concentrated on the sectoral contributions of steel and minerals industries.
They found that border adjustments would reduce the leakage rate rather significantly
in the steel sector, but the effects would be minor in the minerals sector. The reduc-
tion in the overall rate of leakage would be quite modest as well. The authors thus
suggest that the border adjustments would not be effective from an environmental
point of view, but could be justified as measures to retain competitiveness of certain
industries. The two BTA designs applied in the study were both ones with fully
embodied direct emissions. One was based on the emission levels of products in the
EU, and the another on the emission levels in the exporting country. The design
based on the foreign emissions was more effective in preventing leakage than the
more practical one based on emissions in domestic EU production.
A study by Antimiani et al. (2013) compared BTAs with different bases and
aims (carbon content, competitiveness and leakage prevention) with a CGE model.
The result was that BTAs’ effect on global emissions is minimal, and on leakage rate
quite limited. An outcome quite similar to Böhringer, J. Carbone, and Rutherford
(2016). A cooperative scenario where all countries would engage in limiting emissions
would be superior to all border adjustment options. In their model it was impossible
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to set a tariff that would completely eliminate the leakage, since no tariff could
prevent the fall in fossil energy prices following unilateral emission reductions.
In conclusion, the literature seems to indicate that while both border
adjustments and domestic carbon price differentiation reduce leakage, they do it
mainly by enhancing competitiveness of regulating regions at the expense of developing
countries. The policy measures assessed do not seem to enhance the cost-effectiveness
of climate policies. Thus the argument that carbon tariffs or other measures are
necessary to ensure effectiveness of global CO2 reductions is not supported by the
literature. In protecting competitiveness of domestic industries they probably are
effective in certain especially vulnerable sectors, they would be effective. These results
are naturally dependent on whether the scale of carbon leakage itself is correctly
estimated by the models.
5.3 Current policies?
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is the first and largest
regional cap-and-trade system for GHG emissions. The leakage within EU ETS was
first addressed by giving industries generous amounts of free emission allowances.
In the current phase (2013-2020) the amount of free allowances will be gradually
reduced. However, more than 75 percent of the regulated emissions in manufacturing
are exempted from this transition phase. The criteria for an exemption consist of two
measures: carbon intensity of value added and trade exposure. (R. Martin, Muûls,
Preux, et al., 2014)
The benefits of output-based allocations used by the New Zealand and
California, according to Meunier, Ponssard, and Quirion (2014) are that they retain
abatement incentives, and that they level the competition between domestic and
foreign producers, as the perceived cost of home production is reduced. However,
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they might lead to overconsumption of the products in the allocation scheme, since
price for consumers will be lower. Subsidies on capacity, exercised by the EU, on the
other hand can be beneficial, if the goal is to discriminate between demand states. A
capacity subsidy is effective in reducing leakage if leakage occurs when demand is
large and new capacity defines where production increases. This may be true for some
energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors with long planning horizons. Allocation
based on capacity does not lead to overconsumption through its direct effects on
marginal costs of production, but may rather lead to excess capacity, and therefore
a decrease in consumer prices through increased supply. The problem in EU-wide
uniform policy designs is the differences in vulnerability to leakage between different
regions. An optimal policy in one part of Europe may lead to remarkable undeserved
profits for companies in another part of the region. Output-based subsidies might be
the best solution in some countries, and capacity-based allocations in others.
Meunier, Ponssard, and Quirion (2014) compared the output-based alloca-
tions used by California and New Zealand with the free allowance strategy used in the
EU ETS. The findings from their analytical model suggested that the output-based
allocation, or a combination of output- and capacity-based systems would be more
effective than the current system in the level of EU. The current policy in the EU
ETS will induce a welfare loss of around 5% compared to an optimal policy, the
results even suggest that the current policy may be worse than no policy at all in
cement sector.
R. Martin, Muûls, De Preux, et al. (2014) studied compensation rules of
EU ETS by applying to it a fundamental economic logic where payments distributed
to firms should equalize marginal relocation probabilities weighted by the damage
caused by relocation in order to achieve efficiency. They found that the practice in
EU ETS results in significant overcompensation for given carbon leakage risk. A far
smaller amount of free allowances could be handed out while keeping a similar risk
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of aggregate relocation.
R. Martin, Muûls, Preux, et al. (2014) also measured the carbon leakage
risk by assessing the leakage risk on firm-level. The firm-level risk was evaluated on
basis of around 400 interviews with managers of manufacturing companies within the
EU ETS. Based on this method, the authors concluded the leakage risk to strongly
correlated to carbon intensity, but not to trade-exposure. Therefore the authors
argue that free permit allocations to firms that are exposed to trade, but not highly
carbon intensive, is too lax in the current scheme.
All these results, together with the evidence on border adjustments, point
to the direction that the policy measures to prevent carbon leakage within the EU
ETS have been oversized and suboptimal this far. Free allocations are really effective
only in the few most vulnerable sectors, and even there they could be more efficiently
designed.
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6 Discussion and conclusions
Even though many scholars argue in favor of carefully designed carbon tariffs or other
types of border tax adjustments against current policies of free allocations and tax
rebates, the current evidence of the possible effects of tariffs policies raises questions.
Tariffs would probably be a good way to ensure competitiveness of domestic industries,
but from a more global point of view their cost-effectiveness is questionable. They
could easily be seen as a tool to shift the burden of climate policies from developed
to developing world. That might trigger unwanted responses in other countries’ trade
policies, which could lead to protectionism on pretext of other issues as well. On
the other hand, border measures could put more pressure on other regions to adopt
their own emissions regulations.
Compatibility with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
other trade agreements is doubful as well. Additionally, the Kyoto Protocol states
that adverse economic effects to developing countries through terms-of-trade effects
should be minimized (United Nations, 1997). The rules of the WTO allow exceptions
to use trade barriers if it is necessary for the environment (World Trade Organization,
1994), but since the terms-of-trade motive, according to analysis by Böhringer, Lange,
and Rutherford (2014) for example, is more significant element of the tariffs than
their emissions reductions. Taking the terms of trade effect into account when setting
the tariff level - as in the Hoel’s model - would be advisable if the goal is to maximize
domestic welfare. But if global cost-effectiveness is the main target, the use of tariffs
or other border adjustments does not seem to provide very good results. The same
issues are present to some extent with tax differentiation and free permit allocations
as well, but at least this far they have been deemed more practical politically.
Setting correct levels of tariffs or exemptions has been an issue, and will be
in future. Calculation of optimal tariffs on firm-specific level will certainly be too
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difficult to perform, so the tariffs and other measures have to be defined by country-
averages or through some other simplified means. This will eliminate incentives by
companies to adopt their own practices to reduce emissions. So-called demand-side
leakage could be a problem too: countries could find alternative unregulated markets
in which to sell their carbon-intensive products as a result of changes in relative
prices (B. R. Copeland and M. S. Taylor, 2004).
Even though Hoel, 1996 argued that there is no good reasons to implement
tax differentiation instead of tariffs, based on the literature, it seems plausible to
argue that sub-optimal price differentiation can reach most of the benefits of the
tariffs while being easier to implement. The information needed for optimal taxes
might be much larger than the information needed for optimal tariffs as Hoel shows.
However, the information needed for good-enough price differentiation (that retain
majority of the benefits of the optimal policy) is not necessarily that much larger
than "good enough" tariff differentiation. This does not mean that the current
policies implemented by Finland and the EU are close to optimal. Studies suggest
that since free allowances and energy tax rebates are currently handed out quite
generously, they probably contradict the goals of climate policies while doing little to
enhance competitiveness of domestic industries. While allocation of free allowances
will probably be tightened in the near future, too lax emission controls in the present
may be a problem especially if the Green Paradox is a real issue. Significant industry
relocation effects suggested especially by M. Babiker (2005) are certainly a valid
concern partially ignored by studies. Their time horizon however, as well as that
of some other longer-run effects, may be a reason not to put too much weight on
that uncertainty. Climate policy can never achieve its goals in time, if accurate
information is required in advance for all longer-run effects.
As an overall conclusion from the results presented in this thesis, carbon
leakage is probably a tolerable problem for the economy as whole, though there
are large uncertainties in the estimates, as they are based mostly on computable
models, not on direct empirical data. The most vulnerable sectors probably need
some protection in form of tariffs or carbon price differentiation of some sort. It can
be argued that despite recommendations by Hoel’s theoretical model, quantitative
models imply that there are not necessarily massive disadvantages in regulation
exemptions or tax differentiation compared to carbon tariffs. Tariffs would be better
from the domestic point of view, but acceptable results can probably be achieved
via differentiation as well. The key issue whether protective measures should be
adopted at all, is whether the focus should be in domestic welfare gains or global
cost-effectiveness of climate policy. The specific policy measures in use by the EU
and by Finland do not seem to be optimal, but problems with policy design might
rise if tariffs were adopted as well.
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